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Kant’s Account of Real Possibility and the German Philosophical Tradition 
Abstract: Kant’s postulate of possibility states that possible is whatever agrees with the formal 
conditions of experience. As has often been noted, this is a definition of real possibility. However, 
little attention has been paid to the relation of Kantian real possibility to the German philosophical 
tradition before him. I discuss three kinds of possibility present in this tradition – internal, 
external, and (Crusian) real possibility – and argue that Kant endorses internal and external 
possibility. Furthermore, I show, specifically with respect to the concept of state (Zustand), that 
the three traditional conceptions are reminiscent of three conceptions of real possibility that Kant 
implicitly distinguishes. Lastly, I argue that, according to Kant, we need experience to prove real 
possibility (at least as regards the three conceptions of the real possibility of states) because 
otherwise we could not know whether the formal conditions of experience obtain. 
On the face of it, Kant’s conception of “real possibility” looks like a radical departure from the 
philosophical tradition. For his discussion of real possibility occurs within his philosophical 
project to provide principles and conditions that are constitutive of being an object of 
experience, rather than metaphysical principles that apply to things directly. For instance, all 
objects of experience must be in space and time, and every event necessarily has a cause. Kant’s 
discussion of these principles also includes a section on the “Postulates of empirical thinking in 
general,” which establishes principles (“postulates”) for possibility, actuality, and necessity. The 
so-called “postulate of possibility” reads: 
Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and 
concepts) is possible. (A218/B265)1 
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 I quote Kant from the Critique of Pure Reason by reference to page numbers of the A and B edition, all other 
works from the Akademie edition by reference to title, volume, and page number. Many translations, especially of 
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Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, NM = Negative Magnitudes, OPGP = The Only Possible Ground of 
Proof, PM = On the Progress of Metaphysics, Prol = Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Rx = Reflexion x, Rel = 
Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone, RT-x = Rational Theology x (lecture). Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, 




As many Kant scholars point out, this is a definition of “real possibility” in its restriction to 
experience2 – whatever satisfies the principles that are constitutive of experience (the formal 
conditions) is a possible object of experience. 
However, while Kant’s conception of real possibility is indeed novel, there is more continuity 
between the philosophical tradition and Kant in this respect than has been assumed.3 We can 
see this when we look closely at what it means to fulfill these conditions. There are two crucial 
points. First, the formal conditions do not affect all ontological kinds equally. For instance, the 
Second Analogy, which demands that all events are caused, has no significance for substances, 
which are permanent (qua the First Analogy). As a result, there are different conditions of the 
real possibility of substances, of events, and so on. For reasons of space, I focus on the concept 
of ‘state’ (Zustand) in this paper. States are the sum total of accidents at a given point in time 
and the effect of causal actions. Although my restriction to this entity is somewhat arbitrary, the 
concept of states occurs frequently in Kant’s discussion of causality and involves many aspects 
of possibility. 
Second, I will argue that, when Kant talks about real possibility, he sometimes abstracts from 
some formal conditions of experience. It is here where the German philosophical tradition 
before Kant becomes relevant. For I will argue that Kant implicitly distinguishes between three 
conceptions of real possibility that resemble three important conceptions of possibility before 
him. Specifically, Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten distinguish between internal possibility – the 
possibility of something “in its own nature” – and external possibility, which is the possibility of 
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 See Schneeberger 1952: 15f., Motta 2012: 49, Kannisto 2012: 107f., Leech 2014: 342, Abaci 2016: 129f., 2019: 
183, Blecher 2018: 932. – Some scholars hold that real possibility in its restriction to experience is or may be only a 
sub-class of real possibility in a broader sense, according to which even things in themselves might be really 
possible (see Chignell 2014: 574, Stang 2016: 287). Although I am sympathetic to this view, I take no stance on it 
here, as I am only interested in the narrower sense in this paper. 
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 Up to this point, there is barely literature of the connection between Kantian real possibility and the philosophy 
before him. Even Stang (2016), who considers the German modal metaphysics before Kant in some detail, ignores 
this aspect. And although Abaci (2019) discusses the impact of Leibniz and Wolff on Kant’s pre-Critical conception 
of possibility, he is silent on their influence when it comes to Kant’s Critical views. 
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something in accordance with actual, contingent causal conditions. Crusius employs the term 
“real possibility,” which stands for a broadly Aristotelian conception of possibility, according to 
which possibility is grounded in the powers (or capacities) of substances. External possibility 
resembles what I call a-possibility, which is the real possibility of a state insofar as there can be 
an action that causes the state. Crusian real possibility is close to c-possibility, which abstracts 
from the real possibility of an action and only considers whether there are really possible 
capacities to produce a state. Finally, internal possibility is reminiscent of m-possibility, which 
abstracts from causality in general (and hence close to internal possibility) and only considers 
whether an empirical state is really possible with respect to the form and matter of 
appearances. What makes Kant’s account of interest to contemporary readers is that all of 
these three conceptions of real possibility are meaningful ways of talking about possibility. 
I will proceed as follows. Section 1 outlines the implications of Kant’s definition of real 
possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. Section 2 considers the conceptions of 
internal, external, and real possibility before Kant. Section 3 discusses Kant’s treatment of 
internal and external possibility in his published and unpublished work. Sections 4-6 consider 
the different conceptions of real possibility in detail with respect to the exemplaric case of the 
real possibility of states. Section 7 considers an initially puzzling aspect of Kant’s account: he 
argues that we need experience to prove real possibility – otherwise we could not tell whether 
such exotic things like ghostly matter, soothsaying, or telepathy are really possible. I will show 
for each of the conceptions discussed in the previous sections that we need experience to show 
that the formal conditions of experience are really possible. Section 8 concludes. 
1. The Postulate of Possibility as a Definition of Real Possibility 
Kant outlines the notion of real possibility by way of distinguishing it from “logical possibility”: 
The concept is always possible if it does not contradict itself. That is the logical mark of possibility, 
and thereby the object of the concept is distinguished from the nihil negativum. Yet it can 
nonetheless be an empty concept, if the objective reality of the synthesis through which the 
concept is generated has not been established in particular; but as was shown above, this always 
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rests on principles of possible experience and not on the principles of analysis (on the principle of 
contradiction). This is a warning not to infer immediately from the possibility of the concept 
(logical possibility) to the possibility of the thing (real possibility). (A596/B624n)4 
The quote contains ontological as well as epistemological claims about logical and real 
possibility. Logical possibility is the “possibility of the concept” and a semantic notion; a concept 
is logically possible iff there is no contradiction in it. Real possibility, on the contrary, is the 
“possibility of the thing” and akin to ‘metaphysical possibility’ (in contemporary parlance). Since 
categories are pure, non-empirical concepts of objects5, the category of possibility is the 
concept of real possibility.6 Kant argues that real impossibility follows from logical impossibility, 
whereas logical possibility is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition on real possibility. For, in 
addition, an object must also agree with “principles of possible experience.”7 By “as was shown 
above,” Kant is apparently referring back to the postulate of possibility. Consider it again: 
Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and 
concepts) is possible. (A218/B265) 
Kant emphasizes that “the principles of modality” – that is, the postulates – “are also nothing 
further than definitions [Erklärungen]8 of the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity in 
their empirical use” (A219/B266). This means that the postulates are definitions of the modal 
categories.9 As Nunez convincingly argues, the postulates are even real definitions.10 Real 
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 See also Bxxvif.n, A243f./B301f., B302f.n, PM 20:302, 20:325, M-Mrongovius 29:811f. 
5
 See A79f./B105, B128, Prol 4:324. 
6
 The modal concepts form the fourth class in the table categories, of which possibility – or, more precisely, 
possibility and impossibility – is the first (see A80/B106). 
7
 Since these principles belong to transcendental philosophy, Kant sometimes refers to real possibility as 
“transcendental possibility” (see A244/B302, A610/B638). 
8
 “Erklärung” does not always mean “definition” (see A730/B758), but Kant suggests elsewhere that the postulates 
are definitions. Compare A244/B302 with A240f./B300, see also Nunez 2014: 644-8, Stang 2016: 265f. 
9
 The qualification “in their empirical use” suggests that real possibility as defined by the postulate of possibility is 
only a sub-class of real possibility in general; the latter might also apply to things in themselves. But this is not 
uncontroversial and my paper will be restricted solely to real possibility within the bounds of experience. Nor will I 
engage with the accounts of real possibility in general that have recently been provided by Chignell and Stang. 
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definitions “provide a clear mark, by which the object (definitum) can always be securely 
cognized” (A241n).11 Therefore, the postulate of possibility must provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for real possibility. We can thus define real possibility as follows: 
Real Possibility: Something is really possible iff it agrees with the formal conditions of 
experience. 
The formal conditions are the forms of space and time12 and the principles of pure 
understanding.13 The Transcendental Aesthetics contends that objects of experience are 
necessarily spatiotemporal.14 The Analytic of Principles establishes the “principles of pure 
understanding” (A148/B187), which contain “the ground of the possibility of experience” 
(A237/B296), as metaphysical principles for objects of experience. These principles include the 
“axioms of intuition,” “anticipations of perception,” and “analogies of experience” 
(A161/B200)15 – for example, the Second Analogy states that everything that happens in 
experience has a cause16. The fact that these principles are constitutive of experience is the 
reason that they are formal principles of experience. Therefore, an object that does not meet 
these principles cannot be an object of experience, and it is both necessary and sufficient for 
real possibility to meet them. 
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 See Nunez 2014: 644-8. 
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 Nominal definitions, by contrast, would merely explain the meaning of the categories (see A241n). 
12
 See A48f./B66. 
13
 My description of the formal conditions of experience largely agrees with Stang 2011: 447f., 2016: 201-3, Chignell 
2014: 587, Chignell and Stang 2015: 1824, Abaci 2016: 135, 2019: 183. 
14
 See A26/B42, A34/B51. An exception may be made for the soul insofar as it is an object of experience, which 
would be only temporal. 
15
 The Postulates chapter deals with principles of pure understanding too, but, on pain of circularity, the 
“postulates of empirical thinking in general” (A161/B200) cannot belong to the formal conditions of experience 
that are required for the postulate of possibility. Furthermore, it should be noted that the principles proved in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science are not conditions for all empirical objects, but only for material 
bodies. Hence, they are not conditions of real possibility. 
16
 See A189, B232. 
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This also means, on the other hand, that the conditions on real possibility cannot contain 
conditions that are not necessary for being an object of experience, but only for being possible 
under certain contingent conditions. Chignell and Stang reflect this point by distinguishing 
between “formal” and “empirical” possibility. Whereas formal possibility is supposed to be the 
possibility of something insofar as it agrees with the formal conditions of experience (which is 
just the definition of real possibility)17, empirical possibility is meant to be the agreement with 
causal laws and circumstances18. By illustration, consider a cloth of magnetic matter that 
attracts iron filings. While the possibility of this event depends on contingent conditions – for 
instance, it would be impossible if there were a massive barrier between the cloth and the 
filings – the Second Analogy determines that this event also depends on the formal condition 
that it has a cause in experience. Although I generally agree with this distinction, Chignell and 
Stang do not discuss what it means for causality to meet the formal conditions of experience. 
Much of my discussion of real possibility will be concerned with distinguishing merely 
contingent from formal (necessary) causal conditions.19 
There is an issue that significantly complicates my discussion, though. For different ontological 
kinds of entities have different conditions of their possibility. A “state” (Zustand) is the sum total 
of accidents that a substance has at a particular instant20; and as I shall argue, states cannot be 
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 See Stang 2011: 448, 2016: 203, Chignell 2014: 587, Chignell and Stang 2015: 1823. 
18
 See Stang 2011: 453, Chignell 2014: 589, Chignell and Stang 2015: 1823f. Stang (2016: 213) also calls this kind of 
possibility “empirical-causal possibility.” But note that Chignell and Stang do not use the concept “empirical 
possibility” in quite the same way. For Stang, empirical(-causal) possibility is the agreement with causal laws and 
circumstances, whereas in Chignell the term just means the agreement with causal laws. Stang calls the latter 
“nomic possibility” (2016: 255) and also adds the notion of “noumenal(-causal) possibility,” which is the possibility 
that concrete appearances are grounded by things in themselves (see Stang 2011: 457, 2016: 225). I will employ 
similar taxonomy, but connect it to the general distinction between real and external possibility. 
19
 A note on terminology: ‘causal conditions’ are all the conditions that are required for causal actions. They include 
causal laws and causal ‘circumstances.’ The latter encompass preceding events that occasion succeeding events, 
like the rolling of a ball that hits another ball. 
20
 See M-Schön 28:512, M-L2 28:564. 
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actual unless they are caused by an action. But this leaves the real possibility of (material) 
substances themselves unaffected, as their existence is permanent and does not depend on 
causal conditions. In this paper, I provide explicit definitions solely for the real possibility of 
states.21 Determining the conditions of the real possibility of other entities would require 
further discussion of Kant’s metaphysics. For instance, we would need to say more about Kant’s 
causal model in order to fully understand the conditions of the real possibility of actions. But, in 
principle, the conditions of the real possibility of actions, or of other entities, should not be very 
different from the conditions of the real possibility of states. For example, I assume that, just 
like states, the real possibility of actions depends on the real possibility of preceding actions; 
and everything I say about states should be applicable to accidents. 
Yet, even with regard to the real possibility of states, Kant does not embrace just one 
conception of it. Rather, he uses the notion of real possibility in ways that abstract to varying 
degrees from the formal conditions of experience. As we shall see, Kant sometimes considers all 
formal conditions of experience (including those that belong to the formal conditions of causal 
series), sometimes abstracts from the formal conditions of causal series (but does not abstract 
from causal powers), and sometimes abstracts from causality in general. Thus, when we 
combine different kinds of entities with different degrees of abstraction, we obtain a number of 
different conceptions of real possibility, including three conceptions of the real possibility of 
states.22 While Kant does not distinguish the resulting conceptions of real possibility explicitly, 
these conceptions of real possibility align to traditional kinds of possibility; and his thinking 
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 This explains why I neglect the First and the Third Analogy, although they belong to the formal conditions of 
experience. The First Analogy holds that the substance is permanent, but the accidents are changeable. The Third 
Analogy holds that all substances in space necessarily interact. But these Analogies contribute little to 
understanding the possibility of states. 
22
 When I speak of ‘conceptions of real possibility,’ I mean that they are different implementations of the postulate 
of possibility. While they all stand under the general postulate of possibility, these conceptions do not add further 
conditions of possibility to the formal conditions of experience, but rather determine which formal conditions are 
applied to which entities. This differs from Chignell or Stang, who refer to ‘empirical possibility’ etc. as ‘kinds’ of 
real possibility and add conditions that go well beyond the formal conditions of experience. 
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about real possibility was influenced by the traditional theories of possibility. Thus, it will be 
most beneficial to consider the accounts from Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius in some 
detail. 
2. Internal, External, and Real Possibility before Kant 
Despite the wide attention that Leibniz’s metaphysics of modality has received, there has been 
surprisingly little interest in its relation to Kant.23 The key modal problem for Leibniz was to 
avoid necessitarianism (the view that everything that is possible is actual and therefore 
necessary). For he famously holds that God necessarily creates the best possible world – how 
can Leibniz evade the claim that the only possible world is the actual? His solution consists in a 
distinction of two kinds of possibility: On the one hand, per se possibility is the possibility of 
something “in its own nature.”24 This is the possibility something has in itself, irrespective of any 
conditions on which the possibility depends.25 According to Leibniz, something is possible per se 
iff it can be thought without contradiction. But there is also possibility per accidens, which is the 
possibility of something all things considered.26 This presupposes per se possibility, but is also 
dependent on additional conditions. Now Leibniz thinks that the world, and everything that 
happens in it, owes its existence to an act of God’s creation and the pre-establishment of the 
course of the world’s events. Since God can only create the best possible world (qua his 
omnibenevolence), all other worlds are incompatible with his will. Thus, the actual world is the 
best possible world, and all other worlds are impossible per accidens. Nonetheless, these worlds 
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 For important recent exceptions, see Stang 2016: ch. 1 and Abaci 2019: ch. 2. However, both authors focus on 
per se modality and Kant’s pre-Critical philosophy. 
24
 See, e.g., Leibniz, Con 57, also Chignell 2009: 167n20, Stang 2016: 15n11, and the references mentioned there. 
My discussion of Leibniz’s modal metaphysics follows Adams 1994: ch. 2, Newlands 2010, Lin 2012, and Abaci 2019: 
35-54. 
25
 That per se possibility is not dependent on conditions does not mean that it is not grounded. According to 
Leibniz, all essences are grounded in God’s mind; and Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and also Kant have endorsed 
variants of Leibniz’s view. While this is a hotly debated topic, I am able to steer clear of it here. 
26
 Although Newlands (2010: 86-90) casts doubt on it, Lin (2012: 431f.) provides compelling evidence that Leibniz 
explicitly considers them as two kinds of possibility, and not just as two modal aspects of one kind of possibility. 
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are possible per se because they can be thought without contradiction – with regard to their 
essences, these worlds are possible. 
For Leibniz, the possibility of something per accidens depends on the possibility of causal 
conditions that bring this state about – by virtue of causal conditions, something is made 
hypothetically necessary.27 It would go too far to consider Leibniz’s model of causality here, 
which is informed by the infamous doctrine of “pre-established harmony,” which Kant rejects. 
But unlike Leibniz28, Wolff accepts inter-substantial causation and connects this with Leibniz’s 
distinction between possibility per se and possibility per accidens, which Wolff calls “internal” 
and “external” possibility29: 
Internally possible is whatever is possible regarded in itself, that is, which, considered in itself, 
does not include any contradiction [...]. Externally possible is whatever has a determinate cause in 
the visible world, that is, which is able to exist in it [...]. (Wolff, Cosm 111)30 
Wolff argues that internally possible is whatever can be thought without contradiction, whereas 
externally possible is that for which there is a cause. Since causes are grounds of actuality, one 
may wonder why Wolff defines external possibility in terms of actual causes. But Wolff is a 
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 As Leibniz carefully points out, hypothetical necessity does not mean that something would be necessary if some 
condition obtained, but that something is actually necessary because of a condition that in fact obtains. See Adams 
1994: 16-20. 
28
 See Watkins 2005: 24-50, 118-29 for discussion of Leibniz’s and Wolff’s views on causality in relation to Kant. 
29
 For helpful discussion of Wolff’s views on possibility, see Dunlop 2018: 1134f. and Abaci 2019: 59-74. There may 
be differences in the way Leibniz and Wolff spell out the distinction, but the general idea is clearly the same. – 
Dunlop argues that Wolff’s expression “possibility in potentia remota” signifies a broader notion than external 
possibility because this conception “does not involve a connection to what actually exists” (Dunlop 2018: 1135). 
Her reading of this notion is close to Crusian real possibility (see below). However, this strikes me as misguided. For 
possibility in potentia remota is indirectly connected to, and dependent on, grounds in existing substances by a 
causal chain that ultimately produces the object in question (see Wolff, Ont 176). For this reason, Wolff claims that 
a being in potentia remota must have its sufficient ground of existence in the causal series (Ont 178) and not 
merely a potential ground of existence, as Dunlop appears to hold. 
30
 See also GM 574, TN 142, and Dunlop 2018: 1135, Abaci 2019: 71f. 
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determinist: given actual causal conditions, all events are hypothetically necessary.31 Thus, all 
grounds of external possibility are also grounds of actuality; there are no unactualized external 
possibilities.32 Nevertheless, there is a conceptual difference between grounds of existence and 
grounds of external possibility. For Wolff defines a “potential being” as that which “can have its 
sufficient ground of existence” in an existing being (Ont 175). He also distinguishes “powers,” 
which he calls the “source of changes” (GM 115), from “capacities,” which are “the possibility of 
doing something” (GM 117).33 While substances are actual causes by virtue of their powers34, 
they are potential causes by virtue of their capacities. Consequently, grounds of external 
possibility are potential causes, whereas grounds of existence are actual causes. 
Most of the passages in Kant that deal with internal and external possibility are either notes in 
his copy of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica – the textbook on which Kant based his lectures on 
metaphysics – or in transcripts of his lectures on metaphysics in sections which relate directly to 
passages from Baumgarten. Baumgarten writes that “whatever is possible regarded in itself is 
possible in itself” (Baumgarten, M 15 (17:29))35, whereas whatever is possible in connection 
with something else is “hypothetically possible” (Baumgarten, M 16 (17:30)).36 Clearly, he is 
following his teacher Wolff, and these expressions are equivalents for internal and external 
possibility.37 
                                                     
31
 See Wolff, Cosm 112, 114, also Abaci 2019: 73. 
32
 See also Abaci 2019: 73. 
33
 This is a technical distinction. In a broader sense, even capacities are powers. I sometimes use these notions 
interchangeably. See Heßbrüggen-Walter 2004: 57-75 for discussion of Wolff’s account of capacities. 
34
 See Wolff, Ont 881. 
35
 Baumgarten also says that whatever involves no contradiction is possible (see M 8 (17:24)). This is clearly what 
he later refers to as “possible in itself.” See also Abaci 2019: 66. 
36
 Baumgarten mentions “[possibile] intrinsecus, absolute, per se, simpliciter” as alternative expressions for 
“possibile in se” (Baumgarten, M 15 (17:29)), and “[possibile] respective, relative, extrinsecus, per aliud, et 
secundum quid” for “possibile hypothetice” (Baumgarten, M 16 (17:30)). 
37
 There are two important differences to Wolff, though. First, Baumgarten’s notion of hypothetical possibility 
applies to properties that are grounded by other properties in whatever way, including the principle of 
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Lastly, Crusius is also important as Kant adopts the term “real possibility” from him. Crusius’s 
conception of real possibility is reminiscent of a recent trend in contemporary modal 
metaphysics, according to which possibility is grounded in causal powers.38 This means, roughly, 
that something is possible because there are powers that could make it actual – for example, it 
is possible that sugar dissolves in water because of the powers of these objects. In essence, this 
is a revival of an Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle saw possibility – or potentiality – to be 
grounded in actuality39, and so did the Scholastic philosophers influenced by him40. Crusius is an 
heir to this tradition: 
If one considers a possible thing only insofar as one can think it, that is, insofar as that which one 
posits in a concept can be connected in a concept without a contradiction arising either with itself 
or any other true sentence [...]:  then it is called ideal possibility, or the mere possibility in 
thoughts. Some call this metaphysical possibility. But if one directs one’s attention to the fact that 
one can take as given that also sufficient causes for the thing are really present [wirklich 
vorhanden] that only need to come into the state of action [in dem Stand der Action kommen 
dürfen]: then it is called real possibility, or the possibility outside of thoughts. (Crusius, E 56) 
Whereas ideal possibility is the “possibility in thoughts,” real possibility is the “possibility 
outside of thoughts.” Although Crusius does not explicitly distinguish between concepts and 
things as two distinct domains of possibility, his distinction anticipates Kant’s between logical 
and real possibility. But since the principle of contradiction is the criterion for ideal possibility, 
the latter is ultimately an adaptation of internal possibility.41 Real possibility, by contrast, has 
                                                                                                                                                                            
contradiction (M 19 (17:30)), whereas Wolff applies the notion of external possibility only to properties that are 
causally grounded. Second, Baumgarten rejects inter-substantial causation in favor of pre-established harmony (see 
M 463, also Theis 1994: 105f., Kanterian 2018: 143). For more discussion of Baumgarten’s account of possibility, 
see Kanterian 2018: 153-6. 
38
 See Borghini and Williams 2008, Jacobs 2010, and Vetter 2015. 
39
 Aristotle discusses this in Metaphysics Z, e.g., 1048a. 
40
 See Knuuttila 2017. 
41
 When Crusius says that some refer to ideal possibility as “metaphysical possibility,” he must have his teacher 
Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann in mind. Hoffmann distinguishes, among others, between “metaphysical possibility” 
(the possibility of something according to the principle of contradiction, Ver 1077) and “physical possibility” (when 
a substance has the power to act, Ver 1078) and says that one can also refer to the former as “ideal” and the latter 
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“sufficient causes,” which must be distinguished from “determining causes.” The former are 
potential causes, whereas the latter are actual causes that in fact act.42 I will sometimes refer to 
possibility insofar as there are potential causes as Crusian real possibility. 
Crusian grounds of real possibility are similar to Wolffian grounds of external possibility because 
both are potential causes.43 The difference to Wolff is that Crusius abstracts from particular 
causal circumstances that lead to an actual causal series. By illustration, it is really possible that 
a ball rolls because this possibility is grounded in the powers of the ball. But the external 
possibility of rolling depends on causal circumstances (like another ball hitting the ball). Crusius 
makes this distinction in his own way by saying that something can be impossible either 
“absolutely” or “under the position of certain circumstances” (E 58). The latter is just external 
possibility (or something close).44 Absolutely possible, on the contrary, is that “which contradicts 
[neither] itself [nor] the properties of the necessary universal cause of all things” (E 58). This is 
not just ideal possibility, as it requires that a thing be compatible with God’s properties in 
addition to being free of contradiction. Since Crusius distinguishes between only two ways a 
thing can be impossible, absolute possibility must be real possibility. The fact that absolute 
possibility abstracts from all relations to other things does not prevent this: although real 
possibility is defined in terms of powers, real possibility is intrinsic and free of contingent 
conditions because powers belong to the nature of a substance45. 
To sum up, Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten distinguish between internal and external 
possibility; and Crusius adds the notion of “real possibility” – which, like external possibility, is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
as “real” possibility. Notably, physical possibility does not require the existence of a substance (see Hoffmann, Ver 
1078). Although Crusius does not just repeat Hoffmann, he follows him closely. 
42
 See Crusius, E 56, 64, 66, 69, 83(a), 83(b), 405. For the distinction between sufficient and determining grounds, 
see Crusius, De Usu 3, also E 39. 
43
 In Crusius’s scholastic terminology, potential causes are “present actu primo,” whereas actual causes are also 
“present actu secundo” (Crusius, E 64). 
44
 See also E 84, where Crusius speaks of the “possibility of an action.” 
45
 See Crusius, E 39. If Crusius follows Hoffmann in this respect (which he does not make explicit though), then not 
even the contingent fact is required that these substances exist (see n. 41). 
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grounded in causal powers, but, like internal possibility, abstracts from contingent 
circumstances. We will see that all three kinds of possibility have a legacy in Kant’s use of the 
term “real possibility.” 
3. Kant on Internal and External Possibility 
Considering the historical background, it cannot come as a surprise that Kant distinguishes 
between internal and external possibility, too.46 To begin with, in his pre-Critical so-called 
‘possibility proof’ he emphasizes that the proof must be based on internal and not external 
possibility.47 Kant continues to use these notions in his Critical writings.48  For example, he 
distinguishes internal from “absolute” possibility (A324f./B381). While internal possibility is the 
possibility under abstraction from all conditions, absolute possibility is the possibility whatever 
the conditions. Internal possibility is the minimal condition of possibility and met by every 
object whose concept does not contradict itself49, whereas absolute possibility is the maximal 
condition and cannot be met within experience (more on absolute possibility below).50 
In his Reflexionen and lectures51, Kant also distinguishes between internal and external 
possibility: 
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 While some attention has been paid to the distinction of internal and absolute possibility (see Poser 1989, 
Kannisto 2012: 48-50), the distinction of internal and external possibility has almost been overlooked in the 
literature. Even so, this distinction is briefly noted by Theis (1994: 199f.), Chignell (2009: 181), Stang (2016: 15), and 
Abaci (2019: 106); but they may deviate from my reading and also ignore Kant’s endorsement of the distinction in 
the Critical period. 
47
 See OPGP 2:157. 
48
 See e.g. A96, A324f./B381, A370, A597/B625, A626/B654, MFNS 4:511, CPJ 5:400, and Rel 6:155 for internal 
possibility (or possibility “in itself”), and CPJ 5:221, 5:447f. for external possibility. See also “relative possibility” 
(FICPJ 20:250). 
49
 See M-Schön 28:508, M-L2 28:562, M-Mrongovius 29:813. 
50
 See A324f./B381, M-Volckmann 28:406f., M-Schön 28:488, M-Dohna 28:627. 
51
 The relevant passages for discussion of internal and external possibility are A324f./B381, R4297 17:499, R4403 
17:533f., R5181 18:110f., R5185-7 18:111, R5254 18:132f., R5590 18:242, R5691-5 18:327-9, R5698 18:329, R6372-
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Possibility is either internal or external possibility. (R5691 18:327, 1776-89) 
One can say: something is not merely in itself (internally), but also hypothetically52 possible. 
(R6376 18:696, 1790-5) 
Something is possible internally or in and for itself, and relatively in relation and connection with 
other things. ([…] Much is possible internally that in connection is not possible externally, i.e., 
conditionally possible as well; the condition is here as much as a ground, e.g., it is [not only] 
possible in itself that a human being becomes rich, but also conditionally; for his parents are rich, 
i.e., there is moreover a ground for it. […]) [I]t is [internally] possible that a human being should 
arrive at vast riches, but, due to laziness, unsuitability [Unschicklichkeit], and a lack of wealthy 
relatives it is [externally] impossible. (M-Mrongovius 29:813) 
Notwithstanding this, hypothetical possibility can also be regarded in such a way that possibility is 
extended by it, e.g., it is not only internally possible that a human being attains riches, but all the 
more because he has rich relatives and is well-reputed with rich people. By this I extend my 
thought of possibility. – Yet it would be better if one adhered to the division in internal and 
external possibility. (M-Schön 28:488) 
Something can be considered to be internally or also externally possible […]. […] What is 
impossible in itself is also not possible under any condition, for what is nothing in itself cannot be 
something in any conjunction; and what is in turn possible in itself is yet not possible under any 
conditions. (M-Volckmann 28:406f.) 
According to these passages53, it is internally possible for everybody to become rich; and if one 
has rich parents, there is even a ground of the external possibility of becoming rich. For this 
person could inherit the parents’ riches when they die (or previously by a donation so as to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 18:695f., R6376 18:696, M-Volckmann 28:406f., 28:426, M-Schön 28:488, 28:508, M-L2 28:550, 28:562, M-Dohna 
28:627, 28:637, M-Mrongovius 29:813. I will not always explicitly refer to them in the sequel. 
52
 As in Baumgarten, “hypothetically,” “relatively” and “conditionally possible” are apparently equivalent 
expressions to “externally possible” and used interchangeably (though Kant prefers “external possibility,” according 
to the fourth quote). See n. 36 for Baumgarten’s use of these terms. 
53
 Some remarks could be added. First, other than the name suggests, the ground of “external possibility” is not 
necessarily external to a thing, but can be in the same thing (e.g., when the mind has the capacity to prove 
mathematical theorems). Second, even internal possibility is grounded by God (at least in the pre-Critical 
Beweisgrund). Third, like Wolff (Ont 177) and Baumgarten (M 165-8 (17:61f.)), and related to Crusius’s account of 
real possibility (see Crusius, E 56), Kant thinks that external possibility comes in degrees (depending on the strength 
of their grounds). Space limitations prevent me from discussion of these points. 
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avoid taxes).54 However, if the person has no rich relatives, is lazy, and lacks a talent for a 
profession in which she could attain riches, then there is no ground of the possibility of 
becoming rich. Consequently, becoming rich is not externally possible for this particular person. 
I quote these texts extensively because they are too numerous to be an inadequate report of 
Kant’s views by the compilers of the transcripts. It is also beyond reasonable doubt that he 
endorses the distinction between internal and external possibility, instead of merely reporting 
Baumgarten’s view. For Kant criticizes Baumgarten for using the concepts ‘internal’ and 
‘absolute’ possibility interchangeably in quite the same way as in the Critique.55 A further aspect 
where Kant criticizes Baumgarten is that Kant states that the term ‘external possibility’ is 
preferable to ‘hypothetical possibility.’56 Since Kant also uses the terms ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
possibility himself, we can assume that he endorses these conceptions and should understand 
them in the light of his terminological clarification as is reported in the transcripts of his 
lectures. 
Although the quoted texts are not explicit about it, it makes sense to think of the grounds of 
external possibility as causal grounds. Having “rich relatives” and being “well-reputed with rich 
people” are potential causes of events by which the person could become rich; “laziness, 
unsuitability, and a lack of wealthy relatives” mean the absence of potential causes of events 
through which this person could become rich. What is left open is whether external possibility is 
more like Crusian real possibility and concerns merely the causal capacities by which events can 
occur, or whether it is more like Wolffian external possibility and concerns particular events, 
localized at particular times. Strictly speaking, external possibility is the possibility all things 
considered in Wolff and Leibniz. However, we will also discuss conceptions of external 
                                                     
54
 It is striking that Kant sometimes uses examples of social relations to illustrate real grounds. Although he 
apparently has no explicit social ontology, I assume that he takes them to be analogous to other kinds of real 
grounds, in particular physical grounds; so they are suitable examples. 
55
 See also  M-Volckmann 28:406f., M-Schön 28:488. For Baumgarten’s use of these terms, see M 15 (17:29). 
56
 See M-Volckmann 28:406f., M-Schön 28:488, M-L2 28:550, M-Dohna 28:627, M-Mrongovius 29:813. 
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possibility in the following section that abstract from some, but not all contingent conditions. 
Kant’s examples of external possibility would fit to the latter as well. 
However, it is a bit tricky to show that Kant indeed embraces the conception of causal grounds 
of possibility. We can begin with the distinction between “capacity” [Vermögen] and “power” 
[Kraft], which he adopts from Wolff.57 A transcript of a lecture reports: 
Power contains the ground of the actuality of an action, capacity the ground of the possibility of an 
action. (M-Mrongovius 29:823f.)58 
This clearly corresponds to Wolff’s and Crusius’s distinction between potential and actual 
causes. Kant also employs the Crusian term “determining ground” when he points out that 
capacities become powers under appropriate causal circumstances: 
The inner principle of the possibility of an action is now called capacity. But this inner principle of 
the possibility of an action also requires a determining ground so that the action becomes actual; 
and this is power. (M-Schön 28:515) 
As in Crusius, determining grounds are grounds that determine a substance to act so that it 
becomes a ground of actuality.59 But it must well be noted that Kant speaks of the possibility of 
an action, rather than of possibility simpliciter.60 On the one hand, this is fine because different 
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 For a helpful discussion of powers and capacities in Kant see Heßbrüggen-Walter 2004: 136-42. I provide a more 
detailed account of Kant’s views on causality elsewhere, where I argue that the distinction between capacities and 
powers is central for his understanding of the possibility of an action. 
58
 See also R3582-6 17:72-5, R3588-90 17:75-6, M-Volckmann 28:434, M-Schön 28:515, M-L2 28:564, M-Dohna 
28:640. 
59
 See section 2 for Crusius’s distinction between sufficient and determining grounds. It should be noted though 
that determining grounds are involved in a twofold manner here: First, a merely sufficient ground is changed into 
an active determining ground; second, another determining ground causes this substance to be active and to have 
a determining ground. 
60
 This also holds for the passages referenced in n. 58. Note that Kant’s use of the term diverges from mine and 
Crusius’s. Kant refers to faculties as grounds of the possibility of an action because they are necessary conditions of 
actions. Still, actions are subject to the additional condition that they have a determining ground; and Crusius and I 
only speak of ‘possibility of an action’ if this condition is met, too. 
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ontological kinds of entities have different conditions of their possibility. But how do we know 
that capacities are also the ground of the possibility of what is caused by an action, that is, 
states? I will now argue that a state is possible iff an action is possible that causes it.61 
One direction of this biconditional can be proved easily: if an action that brings state s into 
existence is possible, so is s. For actions are defined as “the relation of the subject of causality to 
the effect” (A205/B250).62 Thus, an action without an effect would be a contradiction. From this 
it follows that, since capacities are the ground of the possibility of actions, they are ipso facto 
also the ground of the possibility of the state that would be caused by the action. 
As for the other direction, the Second Analogy states that all events have a cause. Since events 
are changes of states63 and there are no uncaused states, Kant also paraphrases the Second 
Analogy as: every state in appearance is conditioned by a preceding state.64 By illustration, I can 
only become rich if something happens that makes me rich: my wealthy uncle dies, or I sign a 
million dollar contract. If such actions were not possible, it would not be possible to be rich. But 
the powers by which these actions are enabled are called capacities insofar as the powers are 
not active – in this case, capacities are the ground of the possibility to be rich, precisely because 
they are the ground of the possibility of an action that makes me rich. Since the effects of 
actions are states, capacities are necessary conditions of their possibility. This shows that Kant is 
committed to the broadly Aristotelian view that possibility is grounded in potentialities.65 
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 I am speaking of “possibility” in the abstract here, but will specify later to which conceptions of possibility this 
biconditional applies. 
62
 See also A544/B572, M-Schön 28:512, M-L2 28:564f., M-Mrongovius 29:823f. 
63
 See M-L2 28:573. 
64
 See e.g. A195/B240, A198/B243f. 
65
 While I claim that there are causal real grounds of possibility, I take no stance in this paper on whether all real 
grounds are causal, or whether there are non-causal (real) grounds of possibility. 
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Unfortunately, Kant never says how internal and external possibility relate to real possibility.66 
This is not a simple question because, as I said above, Kant uses the term “real possibility” not 
always as involving all formal conditions of experience. Furthermore, one can distinguish 
between various conceptions of external possibility. But the general idea is clear: real possibility 
adds to internal possibility the formal conditions of experience, and then external possibility 
adds to real possibility the contingent conditions of particular circumstances. For the purposes 
of this paper, internal possibility is mainly relevant in its contrast to external possibility; hence, I 
will disregard internal possibility in the sequel. But it will prove very fruitful to explore the 
relations between the various conceptions of external and real possibility. Let us now consider 
the real possibility of states (my main concern in this paper) in detail. 
4. A-possibility 
Our discussion of various conceptions of the real possibility of states begins with a conception 
that encompasses all formal conditions of experience, including all causal ones. But this must be 
contrasted with a conception of external possibility that considers all conditions, period, and 
hence even includes all contingent conditions. This conception of external possibility can best be 
understood by Kant’s discussion of the postulate of necessity, which reads: 
That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with general conditions of 
experience is (exists) necessarily. (A218/B266) 
The postulate does not concern “the existence of things (substances) but of their state of which 
alone we can cognize the necessity” (A227/B279).67 Furthermore, Kant holds that “we cognize 
only the necessity of effects” (A227/B280); and “Everything that happens is hypothetically 
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 There is a Reflexion that could suggest that Kant equates external possibility with real possibility: “Possible in 
thesi (
s
 according to the concept: logically), but not in hypothesi. (
s
 no real possibility.)” (R5695 18:329, 1776-89) 
Since Kant is reported to equate “possibility in thesi” and “possibility in hypothesi” with internal and external 
possibility (see M-Volckmann 28:407, M-L2 28:550), it may seem that the latter is real possibility. But it is not clear 
whether the later addition “no real possibility” is meant as an elucidation of or a contrast to “not in hypothesi.” 
Anyways, I am aware of no other passage that could suggest an identity of real and external possibility. 
67
 My discussion of the postulate of necessity agrees with Abaci 2019: 186f. See also Stang 2016: 214-6. 
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necessary” (A228/B280). This makes sufficiently clear not only that the postulate of necessity 
concerns what Leibniz and Wolff call “hypothetical necessity,” but also that Kant embraces their 
determinism with regard to experience – in the empirical world, there is place neither for 
chance nor for freedom.68 But as we have seen, it follows from determinism that external 
possibility and hypothetical necessity have the same scope: whatever is hypothetically 
necessary is externally possible, and vice versa. Since the possibility of a state depends on the 
possibility of an action (as shown in the last section), we can define the resulting conception of 
possibility as follows: 
A(e)-Possibility69: Some state s at time t is a(e)-possible iff under actual causal conditions 
an action is externally possible that causes s at t.70 
This reveals that a(e)-possibility is a conception of external possibility, as a(e)-possibility is 
dependent on contingent causal conditions. 
Some interpreters have concluded from the postulate of necessity that real possibility and 
(hypothetical) necessity are co-extensional.71 Yet we must be careful here. It is true that a(e)-
possibility must be co-extensional with hypothetical necessity because a(e)-possibility does not 
abstract from contingent conditions. But for this very reason, a(e)-possibility is not a form of 
real possibility. So it should not come as a surprise that Kant expresses agnosticism about the 
relationship of necessity to possibility in a later paragraph of the Postulates: 
Whether the field of possibility is greater than the field that contains everything actual, and 
whether the latter is in turn greater than the set of that which is necessary, are proper questions 
which must be solved synthetically [und zwar von synthetischer Auflösung]72, though they also fall 
under the jurisdiction of reason alone; for they mean, roughly, to ask whether all things, as 
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 See A228/B280 and A534/B562. Kant’s determinism is, of course, enforced by the Second Analogy. 
69
 “a” is for “action”, “e” for “external”. 
70
 One may find it objectionable that, here and elsewhere, I am using the word “possible” in the definiens. But this 
is not a problem as long as definiens and definiendum contain different kinds (or conceptions) of possibility. 
71
 See the references mentioned in Abaci 2016: 150n4. 
72
 Guyer and Wood translate this portion as “and can, to be sure, be solved synthetically.” However, “von 
synthetischer Auflösung” does not mean that these questions can in fact be solved, so I amended their translation. 
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appearances, belong together in the sum total and the context of a single experience, of which 
each given perception is a part which therefore could not be combined with any other 
appearances, or whether my perceptions could belong to more than one possible experience (in 
their general connection). (A230/B282f.) 
The question whether there is “more than one possible experience” means whether “another 
series of appearances in thoroughgoing connection with that which is given to me in perception, 
thus more than a single all-encompassing experience, is possible” (A231f./B284). That is, there 
might be a different causal series that leads to different states instead of the actual series.73 
Therefore, Kant cannot be talking about a(e)-possibility because the possibility in question 
includes counterfactual possibilities – that is, states that are possible under other conditions 
than the actual ones. Since the co-extensiveness of hypothetical necessity and a(e)-possibility 
rules out counterfactual a(e)-possibilities, and since Kant makes no indication that he is no 
longer talking about real possibility, he must mean real possibility in the above quote.74 
But what conception of real possibility does Kant have in mind? I argue that the conception 
resembles a(e)-possibility (which is just a form of external possibility), but abstracts from 
contingent causal conditions. For we want to know whether a causal series, and the states and 
events of which it is composed, is possible under formal conditions of experience even if the 
causal series is not possible given present causal laws and circumstances. As we have seen, a 
state is only possible if there is a possible action that causes it.75 This is required by the Second 
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 Kant’s presentation is a bit unfortunate here. In A230/B282f., he only asks whether actual appearances could 
belong to a different sum total of appearances. But even if this should not be possible, this clearly would not rule 
out the possibility of “more than a single all-encompassing experience.” Since Kant is concerned with the co-
extensionality of possibility and actuality here, we should regard the former question as an inadequate depiction of 
the problem. 
74
 In this regard, I fully agree with Abaci (2016: 141, 2019: 191-4). Chignell and Stang think that Kant does change 
the kind of possibility, but arguably because they hold that formal possibility is not applicable in this context. 
Despite our disagreements, I concur with Stang (2011: 457, 2016: 223f.) that the possibility at issue here involves 
noumenal grounds; and I largely follow his insightful analysis of this paragraph (see Stang 2011: 454-7, 2016: 219-
22). 
75
 Note again that my use of the term ‘possibility of an action’ diverges from Kant’s own use. See n. 60. 
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Analogy and hence part of the formal conditions of experience. If we apply this to states, we can 
define the relevant conception as follows: 
A-possibility: Some state s is a-possible iff an action is really possible that causes s. 
This definition has the real possibility of actions in the definiens. But what are the conditions of 
the real possibility of actions? I cannot discuss Kant’s model of causality in detail here, but I 
assume that it is a formal condition of actions that there be a preceding action by which a 
substance is determined to act.76 Thus, actions are only possible under the condition of 
preceding actions. According to Kant, this means that we cannot know whether counterfactual 
states or actions are really possible, as he argues in a passage shortly after the above quote: 
That which is possible only under conditions that are themselves merely possible is not possible in 
all respects. But this is the way the question is taken when one wants to know whether the 
possibility of things extends further than experience can reach. 
[…] In fact, absolute possibility (which is valid in every respect) is no mere concept of the 
understanding, and can in no way be of empirical use; rather it belongs solely to reason, which 
goes beyond all possible empirical use of the understanding. (A232/B284f.) 
Here Kant distinguishes between possibility that obtains only under “conditions that are 
themselves merely possible”77 and “absolute possibility,” which is valid “in all respects.” If a 
condition is merely possible, the condition is contingent. But possibility that obtains under 
contingent conditions is external possibility. “Absolute possibility,” or possibility “in all 
respects,” on the contrary, is unconditioned possibility, or possibility whatever the 
circumstances. For example, an action that is possible independently of other actions would be 
absolutely possible.78 Kant’s determinism rules out absolute possibility within experience, 
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 See A543/B571, Prol 4:343f. 
77
 These conditions cannot be the formal conditions of experience. Kant admits that there might be “other forms of 
intuition (than space and time) or other forms of understanding (than the discursive form of thinking, or that of 
cognition through concepts),” but holds that they “would still not belong to experience” (A230/B283). Thus, the 
formal conditions of experience are not “merely possible”. Here I agree with Stang 2016: 221f., Abaci 2019: 189f. 
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 See also A324/B381, M-Volckmann 28:406, M-Schön 28:488, M-L2 28:550. – Absolute possibility is sometimes 
understood as the possibility of things in themselves in contrast to ‘relative possibility,’ which is supposed to be the 
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where every action is conditioned by a preceding action. This is why the concept of absolute 
possibility “belongs solely to reason” – it transcends the limits of experience, just like freedom 
or absolute necessity, as it seeks for the unconditioned ground of conditioned possibility in 
experience. If there is absolute possibility, then it must be in the realm of things in themselves. 
Nevertheless, since there is room for absolute possibility only outside experience, we have to 
wonder why Kant connects this notion with the question whether there could be counterfactual 
possibilities within experience. The answer can be given by a look at the Third Antinomy. This 
antinomy famously consists in the clash of the “thesis” that there must be a first cause with the 
“antithesis,” according to which there is an infinite causal series in which there is no first 
cause.79 Kant’s resolution of the Third Antinomy consists in assuming the possibility of an 
unconditioned cause of the empirical world outside experience.80 Such a cause would not only 
be the unconditioned ground of a causal series, but for this reason also of a-possible states. By 
illustration, a malicious lie is hypothetically necessary given actual causal conditions and hence 
a(e)-possible. But assuming that I am free as a noumenal being, there would be an absolutely 
possible ground of the a-possibility that I speak the truth instead of lying.81 
However, freedom is just an example of the more general point that things in themselves 
ground appearances and that a different empirical world may be grounded in different grounds 
of things in themselves (for instance, if God chooses to create a different world).82 But precisely 
                                                                                                                                                                            
possibility relative to the formal conditions of experience (see Wood 1978: 44-6, Abaci  2014: 4, 2016: 131, 2019: 
106, Kilinc 2015: 1595). But it is hard to see how this reading is supported by the texts, and it has no obvious 
advantage over the reading that I propose. My interpretation also differs from Poser 1989: 125, 128, and Kannisto 
2012: 49. 
79
 See A444/B472-A451/B479. 
80
 See A537/B565. 
81
 In the first Critique, Kant emphasizes that we cannot know whether we are in fact free (see A557f./B585f.). In the 
second Critique, however, he holds that we can know freedom through the moral law (see CPrR 5:3f., 5:29f.), albeit 
merely in a practical regard (see CPrR 5:56f.). I cannot discuss here whether this means that we can infer 
knowledge of absolute possibility then. 
82
 See Stang 2011: 458-60, 2016: 223-5. 
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because the unconditioned ground of all possibility cannot be found in experience we cannot 
know whether a counterfactual causal series is really possible. For we have no means to know 
whether there is such an unconditioned ground in the noumenal realm. This explains Kant’s 
agnosticism about counterfactual possibilities. 
As regards the grounds of the a-possibility of actual states, though, we cannot in the same 
manner infer that they are grounded in an absolutely possible noumenal ground. For Kant 
makes clear that the contingency of the empirical world does not justify the inference to an 
unconditioned ground as a condition of its real possibility. Rather, he holds that the empirical 
world is never given as a whole; it is merely an illusion that there is an unconditioned cause, 
and, by extension, an unconditioned ground of a-possibility, within experience.83 But if we want 
to explain the real possibility of counterfactual states, it is a formal condition of real possibility 
that there be an absolutely possible ground outside experience that grounds them.84 
5. C-Possibility 
A-possibility considers whether an action is really possible that causes a certain state. But Kant 
is sometimes interested only in the states that are really possible through the capacity of 
substances while abstracting from whether these capacities can be made active. This is roughly 
the sense in which Crusius uses the term “real possibility.” However, there are several levels of 
abstraction to be distinguished. 
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 See A561f./B589f., also A609f./B637f. 
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Here we must distinguish between what, paradoxically, may be called ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ absolute 
possibility. For, while Kant occasionally seems to reserve the concept of absolute possibility to God (see R4688 
17:676, R4690 17:676, R5254 18:132f.), he applies it to freedom on other occasions (see R5179 18:110, R5181 
18:110). Free actions are possible whatever the circumstances, but it is clearly contingent whether free beings 
(other than God) exist at all. This renders the possibility of states that are possible by virtue of human freedom akin 
to external possibility. By contrast, God would be the absolutely necessary being that is not in need of being 
grounded. Therefore, states in experience that are possible through divine actions are a-possible and not 
dependent on contingent conditions. 
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First, one can consider the capacities of particular substances and what is possible through 
them. This meaning is at place, I take it, when Kant says that it is externally possible for 
someone to be rich because this person has the capacity of industriousness. Generalizing, every 
substance has particular powers – be it humans, other living beings, or material objects. And 
since no substance can be merely passive, but must contribute its own powers to change its 
state85, the possibility of a state is co-dependent on the capacities of that substance. The 
possibility of becoming rich if one has the capacities of industriousness, etc., can be understood 
in terms of dependency on particular causal capacities. This makes it a conception of external 
possibility. 
Second, one can abstract from particular substances and say that something is possible if there 
are any actual substances that can cause some state. According to a recent interpretive trend – 
which I endorse – natural laws are built up from capacities (or powers) of actual substances.86 
On this view, some state is “nomically possible” (as Stang (2016: 255) puts it) if there is a 
substance (or a multiplicity of concurring substances) with capacities that can produce a certain 
effect. For instance, it is nomically possible that salt dissolves in water if there are actual 
substances with capacities that can cause this event. Or, to quote an example Kant gives, 
“expanding force” is a “physical ground” that makes impenetrability “possible in the first place” 
(MFNS 4:502).87 But Kant clearly does not think that laws of nature are entailed by the formal 
conditions of experience, so other laws and capacities (or powers) than the actual ones might 
be really possible.88 For this reason, nomic possibility is not real possibility. On the other hand, 
nomic possibility does not depend on particular, changeable circumstances; therefore, nomic 
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 See M-Schön 28:513, M-Dohna 28:640, M-Mrongovius 29:823. 
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 See Kreines 2009, Stang 2016: 238-44, Massimi 2017, Messina 2017. 
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 As Abaci (2016: 152n22) points out, one transcript of Kant’s lectures defines “physical possibility” as “that which 
does not conflict with the laws of experience” (M-Mrongovius 29:812), where the laws clearly are empirical laws 
(Kant uses the example of building a large palace within four weeks, see M-Mrongovius 29:812). Apparently, 
physical possibility is nomic possibility. But since one single transcript is no sufficient evidence, I do not take this 
passage as decisive evidence. 
88
 See A127, B165, CPJ 5:180, 5:184, and the discussion of these passages in Stang 2016: 230f. 
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possibility can be called a conception of external possibility only insofar as nomic possibility 
depends on what kinds of substances actually exist. 
Third, one may abstract from the actual world at all and say that some state is really possible if 
there are really possible substances with really possible capacities to produce this state.89 
Telepathy or mental community would be really possible in this sense if substances with such 
capacities were really possible (which is, however, beyond the scope of our available 
knowledge).90 This is a conception of real possibility because it fully abstracts from contingent 
conditions. Since this conception of real possibility depends on causal powers, it resembles 
Crusian real possibility. 
The three kinds of possibility may be defined like this: 
C(e)-Possibility91: Some state s of substance S is c(e)-possible iff S has capacities to cause s 
under appropriate causal circumstances.92 
C(n)-Possibility93: Some state s is c(n)-possible iff there are actual substances with 
capacities that would cause s under appropriate causal circumstances. 
C-Possibility: Some state s is c-possible iff there are really possible substances with 
really possible capacities that would cause s under appropriate causal 
circumstances. 
Kant is committed to c-possibility by his view that other laws of nature might be really possible. 
This is different from saying that other causal series are really possible (a-possibility) because 
the latter also requires the real possibility of causal circumstances that ground a causal series, 
from which laws of nature abstract. This ensures the distinctness of a- and c-possibility. Now let 
us turn to a third conception of real possibility. 
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 I cannot discuss the real possibility of capacities and substances here. The minimal condition, however, is that 
they satisfy the constitutive principles of experience (see the next section). 
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 See section 7 for discussion of this point. 
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 “c” for “capacity”, but also with a nod to Crusius. “e” again stands for “external”. 
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 The appropriate causal conditions may include causal interaction and therefore powers of other substances. 
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C-possibility differs from a-possibility in that it abstracts from actions that could cause a state. 
But one can make one further step and abstract even from temporal connections (and their 
causal relations) in general. Kant’s distinction between “constitutive” and “regulative” principles 
of understanding is key here. Constitutive principles – the axioms of intuition and anticipations 
of perception – do not invoke temporal relations; they only demand that appearances have 
spatio-temporal form (and extensive magnitude) and reality as its matter (which has intensive 
magnitude). By contrast, regulative principles – the analogies of experience and the postulates 
of empirical thinking in general – do include temporal relations.94 For this reason, Kant says that 
the constitutive principles pertain to “appearances with regard to their mere possibility” 
(A178/B221). Clearly, possibility here consists only in the matter and form of appearances, as 
required by the constitutive principles, and abstracts from temporal and causal relations.95 
Restricting the scope to states again, we can thus define a third conception of real possibility: 
M-possibility96: Some state is m-possible iff the state has spatiotemporal form and sensible 
matter (reality). 
M-possibility is the possibility of the state of appearances isolated from their connections to 
other appearances, or else from succeeding states of the same appearance. Thus, m-possibility 
abstracts from causality in general, by which it resembles internal possibility. 
Kant appears to think along these lines in his discussion of the “principle of thoroughgoing 
determination” in the second section of the Transcendental Ideal. He begins by noting: 
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 Another way to put the difference between constitutive and regulative principles is that the former are 
constitutive of appearances, whereas the latter, despite being regulative for appearances, are constitutive of 
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analogies of experience (compare A110 with A180f./B222-4). Thus, even “regulative” principles are constitutive of 
experience, which is why the formal conditions of experience include them. See Stang 2016: 220 for a similar view. 
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Every thing, in regard of its possibility, stands under the principle of thoroughgoing determination; 
according to which, among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with 
their opposites, one must apply to it. (A571f./B599f.) 
As the ensuing discussion makes clear, the “possible predicates” either “express a being” 
(A574/B602) – that is, a “reality (thinghood)” (A574/B602) – or express a non-being (the 
absence of reality)97. Predicates that express a being are “transcendental affirmations,” whereas 
predicates that express a non-being are “transcendental negations.”98 Therefore, there are pairs 
of possible predicates where a transcendental affirmation expresses the being of a reality, while 
a transcendental negation expresses the absence of this reality – for example, light and 
darkness, wealth and poverty.99 Thus, the “principle of thoroughgoing determination” requires 
determining of each such pair whether the thing has a reality or lacks it. 
But what is the kind of possibility according to which these predicates are possible predicates? 
The following passage from the Transcendental Ideal helps to answer this question: 
The possibility of objects of sense is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which something 
(namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori, but what constitutes the material, the reality 
in appearance (corresponding to sensation) has to be given; without that nothing at all could be 
thought and hence no possibility could be represented. (A581/B609) 
Abstracting from epistemic aspects for a moment, Kant argues that possibility has two 
conditions: the possibility of the sensible form and the possibility of its matter. But these are 
just the conditions of m-possibility, and it is pretty clear that causal relations are irrelevant in 
this context. Assume a state (as the sum total of predicates) were m-possible, but not c- or a-
possible. There would be no reason why one should exclude the predicates that belong to this 
state from the realm of the possible predicates that serve for the thoroughgoing determination 
of an object. Even if there were no possible capacities or actions that could make a predicate 
instantiated, we could make a negative judgment that this predicate does not pertain to the 
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 See A574f./B602f. 
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object. Thus, the kind of possibility that is required for the principle of thoroughgoing 
determination is m-possibility.100 
7. Why Do We Need Experience to Prove Real Possibility? 
Given that Kant determines the formal conditions of experience a priori, we might think that we 
can also prove a priori whether something is really possible. Nevertheless, while Kant affirms 
this for categories and mathematical concepts101, he denies it for other concepts. For example, 
he holds that we cannot know without experience whether ghostly matter and the like are 
really possible. In this section, I discuss recent interpretations of this claim and, contrary to 
them, plea for a straightforward reading: we cannot know real possibility without experience – 
specifically, not a-, c-, and m-possibility – because we cannot know without experience whether 
the formal conditions of experience are met. 
In the Postulates, Kant holds that the possibility of some objects could only be proved a 
posteriori: 
But if one wanted to make entirely new concepts of substances, of powers, and of interactions 
from the material that perception offers us, without borrowing the example of their connection 
from experience itself, then one would end up with nothing but figments of the brain, for the 
possibility of which there would be no indications at all, since in their case one did not accept 
experience as instructress nor borrow these concepts from it. Invented concepts of this sort 
cannot acquire the character of their possibility a priori, like the categories, as conditions on which 
all experience depends, but only a posteriori, as ones given through experience itself, and their 
possibility must either be cognized a posteriori and empirically or not cognized at all. 
(A222/B269f.) 
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 Here I disagree with Stang (2016: 292), who holds that the kind of possibility in this case must be noumenal(-
causal) possibility, which is close to what I call a-possibility and involves noumenal, absolutely possible grounds (see 
section 4). I suspect that he is putting the cart before the horses. For the realm of m-possible predicates is already 
known as possible, and reason only then seeks for an unconditioned condition of these predicates. 
101
 Kant holds that the real possibility of the objects of categories is proved by supplying the categories with 
sensible schemata (see A145f./B185, A247/B304), whereas the real possibility of mathematical objects is shown by 
constructing them in pure intuition (see A220f./B268, A223f./B271f., A240/B299). 
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Following this passage, Kant mentions examples that illustrate such cases for the categories of 
relation (substance-accident, cause-effect, community): a “substance that was persistently 
present in space yet without filling it,” “a special fundamental power of our mind to intuit the 
future,” and “a faculty of our mind to stand in a community of thoughts with other humans” 
(A222/B270).102 These are concepts that we “make from the material that perception offers us” 
(we arbitrarily combine concepts that are given to us in experience), but we do not know if the 
objects represented by these concepts are really possible (A222/B269).103 Kant also says about 
“reality” (the first category of quality) that “it is evidently intrinsically forbidden to think it in 
concreto without getting help from experience” (A223/B270).104 In brief, he thinks one cannot 
know the real possibility of all these objects without experience.105 It is also important to note 
that Kant’s point is merely epistemic – he does not say that these objects are impossible 
(though he surely assigns little credence to their existence), but only that we cannot know if 
they are (really) possible.106 
There are two reactions to this problem in the literature. Chignell and Stang hold that these 
epistemic restrictions only apply to what they call ‘empirical possibility’ – that is, when Kant says 
that we cannot know possibility without experience, he means that we cannot know whether 
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 See also A770f./B798f. 
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 See Abaci 2016: 139, 2019: 195f. 
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 See also A581/B609.  
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 One might think that experience is only an enabling and not an evidential condition of knowing real possibility. I 
admit that Kant is not very clear on the difference between these two functions of experience. But while 
experience has the enabling function of making us acquainted with sensible realities, I hope to show that 
experience is not merely enabling, but also evidential with regard to a-, c-, and at least some cases of m-possibility. 
See n. 121 for a brief discussion of cases of m-possibility in which experience may be only enabling. 
106
 See also Abaci 2019: 196f. Stang (2016: 204n22) puts forth interesting arguments that may show that these 
objects cannot be really possible, on Kantian assumptions. However, the question is what Kant intends these cases 
to illustrate, and the text suggests that he does not consider them objects that are really impossible, but objects of 
which we cannot know whether they are really possible. 
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there are contingent causal conditions that allow something to happen.107 Yet, apart from the 
problem that Kant does not use the term ‘empirical possibility,’ he never says that we can 
always know a priori whether something meets the formal conditions of experience.108 Instead, 
I agree with Abaci that, according to Kant, we need experience to prove real possibility (and not 
‘empirical possibility’).109 
Nonetheless, Abaci’s rationale is unconvincing. For he agrees with Chignell that we would need 
experience to rule out “real repugnance.”110 Kant uses this notion both in pre-Critical and 
Critical work111, and Chignell holds that real repugnance can render something impossible, 
according to Kant. Crucially, Chignell distinguishes between what he calls “predicate-canceling” 
and “subject-canceling” real repugnance. The prominent examples of mutually opposing forces, 
or other opposing magnitudes, are cases of predicate-canceling real repugnance, in which 
particular (non-essential) effects are rendered impossible, according to Chignell. Clearly, 
predicate-cancelling real repugnance is only a case of a(e)-impossibility – it depends on 
contingent circumstances whether, say, two forces cancel each other; and Chignell may even 
agree on that point. But he holds that there is also subject-canceling real repugnance in Kant, 
which is meant to include contemporary non-logical impossibilities like the alleged fact that 
water cannot be XYZ.112 According to Chignell and Abaci’s reading, only subject-canceling real 
repugnance can render something really impossible because this cancels the whole subject.113 
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 See Stang 2011: 452, 460f., Chignell 2014: 588-93, Chignell and Stang 2015: 1824. See n. 21 for their use of 
‘empirical possibility’ and related expressions. 
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 See also Abaci 2016: 137, 2019: 189f. 
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 See Abaci 2019: 197. 
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 See Abaci 2016: 140, 2019: 197, Chignell 2009: 171-7. 
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 See e.g. NM 2:175, A273/B329. 
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 See Chignell 2009: 172-4. 
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 See Chignell 2009: 174.  Abaci is critical of Chignell’s account (see Abaci 2019: 110-4), but ultimately concedes 
that Kant is committed to subject-canceling real repugnance (see Abaci 2019: 114f., 197). 
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One problem with this view is that Kant does not refer to real repugnance as an impediment to 
real possibility in the Critique.114 Another is that it is highly doubtful that he in fact accepts 
subject-canceling real repugnance.115 Chignell points to a transcript in which Kant is reported to 
have said that we cannot know whether God is really possible because we cannot rule out real 
repugnance between his realities, which Chignell reads as a case of subject-canceling real 
repugnance.116 Yet note that Kant does not say that there might be real repugnance between 
realities themselves, but only “with respect to all their effects” (RT-Pölitz 28:1025).117 This 
suggests that he is speaking about predicate-canceling real repugnance even in the case of God. 
And at least in Beweisgrund, Kant emphasizes that two opposed forces whose effects cancel 
each other out are nonetheless “simultaneously possible within a body” (OPGP 2:86).118 While it 
is true that Kant holds that predicate-canceling real repugnance would render God really 
impossible119, the reason apparently is not that he could not simultaneously instantiate all 
perfections, but that real repugnance would itself be an imperfection and hence contradict the 
concept of God as the most perfect being.120 Absent clear cases of subject-canceling real 
repugnance, real repugnance should not be considered an impediment to real possibility. 
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 See e.g. the passages quoted in Chignell 2009: 189n50, which only show that Kant thinks we cannot prove the 
real possibility of God, but not that the reason for it is that we cannot rule out real repugnance. 
115
 See also Yong 2014: 47n12. One passage from Beweisgrund that is often taken to be an example of subject-
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Nonetheless, if we look back to our discussion in the preceding sections, we can grasp why 
experience is needed for real possibility. Let us begin with m-possibility. We have seen that Kant 
holds that it is “intrinsically forbidden” to think a reality “in concreto without getting help from 
experience” (A223/B270). This means that we need experience to prove the real possibility of 
realities. Since realities are the matter of m-possibility, it follows that we need experience to 
prove m-possibility. For example, we cannot know whether states of ghostly matter are m-
possible because we cannot prove the real possibility of this kind of reality.121 
As for a- and c-possibility, we can trivially infer them from actuality, but what about 
counterfactual states? Both conceptions require knowing whether there are really possible 
powers by which certain counterfactual states could be caused. However, how could we know 
what kinds of powers are really possible without experience? We have no a priori knowledge of 
capacities122 (except in the case of repulsive and attractive forces123); and from experience we 
are merely acquainted with the effects of powers, which only allows for inductive inferences to 
the grounds.124 Thus, we cannot know whether capacities to foresee the future or to interact 
directly with other minds are a- or c-possible. And in addition, knowledge of a-possibility would 
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 As regards m-possibility, one may wonder whether experience only has an enabling and not an evidential role in 
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require that we know whether a causal chain grounded in noumenal absolute possibility is 
possible, which is far beyond the limits of our knowledge.125 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have considered Kantian real possibility in its historical context. While the 
general definition of real possibility is provided by the postulate of possibility, my analysis has 
shown that we can find three conceptions of real possibility in Kant’s work as regards the 
implementation of the postulate with respect to states. These three conceptions resemble three 
kinds of possibility that his predecessors embraced. What I have called “m-possibility” 
corresponds to possibility per se, or internal possibility; “c-possibility” corresponds to Crusian 
real possibility; and “a-possibility” corresponds to hypothetical, or external, possibility. A-
possibility considers all formal conditions that make a state really possible and Kant uses this 
conception at the end of the Postulates in his discussion of co-extensionality. C-possibility 
abstracts from causal actions and is employed to point out that other laws of nature might be 
really possible. Lastly, m-possibility abstracts from causality in general and is used in the 
Transcendental Ideal with respect to the principle of thoroughgoing determination. 
Furthermore, Kant endorses internal possibility and various conceptions of external possibility. I 
have also shown that we cannot prove any of these three conceptions of real possibility without 
experience (at least in most cases) because we need experience two show that some state 
meets the formal conditions of experience.126 
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 Since we cannot determine the scope of the three conceptions of real possibility considered in this paper, we 
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possibility (if an action that would cause a state is really possible, then there must be really possible powers to 
cause this state) and c-possibility in turn entails m-possibility (if there are really possible powers to cause a state, 
then the state must be really possible with respect to the form and matter of appearance), the respective converse 
does not hold. Therefore, it might be that the scope of m-possibility is larger than that of c-possibility, which in turn 






Abaci, Uygar (2014): “Kant's Only Possible Argument and Chignell's Real Harmony.” Kantian Review 19/1, 
1-25. 
Abaci, Uygar (2016): “The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant’s Modal Agnosticism in the ‘Postulates.’” 
European Journal of Philosophy 24/1, 129-158. 
Abaci, Uygar (2019): Kant’s Revolutionary Theory of Modality. Oxford. 
Adams, Robert M. (1994): Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford. 
Baumgarten, Alexander G. (M): Metaphysica. Reprinted in vol. 17 of the Akademie-Ausgabe. 
Blecher, Ian (2018): “Kant’s Principles of Modality.” European Journal of Philosophy 26, 932-944. 
Borghini, Andrea and Williams, Neil E. (2008): “A Dispositional Theory of Possibility.” Dialectica 62, 21-41. 
Chignell, Andrew (2009): “Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being.” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 91, 157-192. 
Chignell, Andrew (2014): “Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and 
Coherence.” Kant-Studien 105/4, 573-597. 
Chignell, Andrew, and Stang, Nicholas F. (2015): “Postulate des empirischen Denkens.” In M. Willaschek 
et al. (eds.), Kant-Lexikon. Berlin, 1822-1827. 
Crusius, Christian August (De Usu): De usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis vulgo sufficientis. 
Leipzig 1743. 
Crusius, Christian August (E): Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen 
entgegen gesetzet werden. Reprint of the edition Leipzig 1745. Hildesheim 1964. 
Dunlop, Katherine (2018): “The origins and “possibility” of concepts in Wolff and Kant: Comments on 
Nicholas Stang, Kant's Modal Metaphysics.” European Journal of Philosophy 26, 1134-1140. 
Heßbrüggen-Walter, Stefan (2004): Die Seele und ihre Vermögen: Kants Metaphysik des Mentalen in der 
>Kritik der reinen Vernunft<. Paderborn. 
Hoffmann, Adolph Friedrich (Ver): Vernunft-Lehre, darinnen die Kennzeichen des Wahren und Falschen 
aus den Grundsätzen des menschlichen Verstandes hergeleitet werden. Leipzig 1737. 
Jacobs, Jonathan (2010): “A Powers Theory of Modality: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject 
Possible Worlds.” Philosophical Studies 151, 227-248. 
Kannisto, Toni (2012): From Thinking to Being: Kant’s Modal Critique of Metaphysics. Unpubl. Diss., Oslo. 
Kilinc, Berna (2015): “Möglichkeit.” In M. Willaschek et al. (eds.), Kant-Lexikon. Berlin, 1591-1595. 
35 
 
Knuuttila, Simo (2017): "Medieval Theories of Modality." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/modalits-medieval/>.  
Kreines, James (2009): “Kant on the Laws of Nature and the Limitations of our Knowledge.” European 
Journal of Philosophy 17/4, 527-558. 
Leech, Jessica (2014): “Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the Possible, the Actual, and the Intuitive 
Understanding.” Kantian Review 19/3, 339-365. 
Leibniz, G.W. (Con): Confessio Philosophi: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil 1671-1678. Transl. and 
ed. R. Sleigh. New Haven, 2005. 
Lin, Martin (2012): “Rationalism and Necessitarianism.” NOÛS 46/3, 418-448. 
Massimi, Michela (2017): “Grounds, Modality, and Nomic Necessity in the Critical Kant.” In M. 
Massimi/A. Breitenbach (eds.), Kant and the Laws of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
150-170. 
Messina, James (2017): “Kant’s Necessitation Account of Laws and the Nature of Natures.” In M. 
Massimi/A. Breitenbach (eds.), Kant and the Laws of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
131-149. 
Motta, Giuseppe (2012): Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt. Berlin. 
Newlands, Samuel (2010): “The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 81/1, 64-104. 
Nunez, Tyke (2014): “Definitions of Kant's categories.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44/5-6, 631-657. 
Poser, Hans (1989): “Kants absolute Modalitäten.” In G. Corsi/C. Magnione/M. Mugnai (eds.), Atti del 
Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica – Le Teorie delle Modalita. Bologna: CLUEB. 
Schneeberger, Guido (1952): Kants Konzeption der Modalbegriffe. Basel. 
Stang, Nicholas (2011): “Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the ‘a Priori’?” Noûs 45/3, 443-471. 
Stang, Nicholas (2016): Kant’s Modal Metaphysics. Oxford. 
Theis, Robert (1994): Gott: Untersuchung der Entwicklung des theologischen Diskurses in Kants Schriften 
zur theoretischen Philosophie bis hin zum Erscheinen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Stuttgart. 
Vetter, Barbara (2015): Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford. 
Watkins, Eric (2005): Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. New York. 
36 
 
Wolff, Christian (GM): Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch 
allen Dingen überhaupt („German Metaphysics“). Reprint of the 11th edition, 1751. Ed. by C.A. Corr. 
Hildesheim 1983. 
Wolff, Christian (Cosm): Cosmologia Generalis. Reprint of the 2nd edition, 1737. Ed. by J. École. 
Hildesheim 1964. 
Wolff, Christian (Ont): Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia. Reprint of the 2nd edition, 1736. Ed. by J. École. 
Hildesheim 1962. 
Wolff, Christian (TN): Theologia Naturalis (“Natural Theology”), Part 1.1. Reprint of the edition of 1739. 
Ed. by J. École. Hildesheim 1978. 
Wood, Allen W. (1978): Kant’s Rational Theology. Ithaca. 
Yong, Peter (2014): “God, Totality and Possibility in Kant’s Only Possible Argument.” Kantian Review 
19/1, 27-51. 
